The Euthyphro Dilemma Essay -- Philosophy Plato Euthyphro

The Euthyphro DilemmaIn Platos dialogue, Euthyphro, Socrates presents Euthyphro with a choice Is what is unworldly loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?Euthyphro responds by insist that piety is that which is approved loved or sanctioned by the gods whence impiety is whatever is disapproved of by the gods. However, as Socrates pourboires come in, the school principal poses a dilemma for those who remember as Euthyphro does that Truth is revealed by divine authority alone.Now, a dilemma is an argument forcing a choice of two unfavourable alternatives. The important point here is that the alternatives must be equally unfavourable. Simply to be set about with two alternatives is not to be faced with a dilemma. To appreciate wherefore each of the options set out above are unpalatable for Euthyphro, we study to unpack the import of each alternative carefully.In drawing out the implications of Socrates argument, I intend to subst itute the word theology for Platos gods this change will not affect the potency of the argument, and will make the dilemma more local and relevant to the modern reader.Essentially, the dilemma faced by Euthyphro is this If it is maintained that authoritative actions and dispositions are good simply because God favours them, then it seems that the distinction between good and wretched, right and wrong, is purely arbitrary for no cogitate send packing be given why God should favour one physical body of action rather than another. The distinction is solely a matter of Gods taste, upright as it is a matter of my taste that I prefer prawns to oysters. As no reason can be given why God should favour, say, justice and kindness, he might equally have favoured their opposites. In which oddball ... ...d so, the dilemma has not been resolved completely after all.Undoubtedly, anyone holding a theistic conception of morality must find some model for divinely revealed moral commands bu t it may be that in so doing the theist weakens their resolution of the dilemma. On the one hand, they want to say that the question of whether an alleged special revelation concerning moral matters comes from God is to be answered in the light of our rationally established criteria of good and evil. This suggests that morality has no requisite of revelation. On the other hand, they want to say that, for the theist, ultimate questions of good and evil cannot be answered apart from reference to special revelation. This suggests that, in the final analysis, our reason is inadequate as a source of the knowledge of good and evil. It is profound to see how the theist can have it both ways.